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BAR BRIEFS
MARRIED WOMEN'S PROPERTY RIGHTS
IN NORTH DAKOTA
In this paper I will attempt to make a survey of the more
outstanding features of North Dakota law in respect to the property rights of married women, and compare some of our Code
provisions with those of other states.
According to the law of this state, a married woman has the
same capacity and rights with respect to property, contract, and
torts, and is subject to the same liabilities as before marriage.'
Twenty-two other states also give women this same freedom to
contract. Six other states give a married woman full capacity to
contract except that she cannot convey real estate without her
husband joining in the conveyance.! Our neighboring state of
Minnesota belongs to this group. In five states, Arizona, California, Nevada, New Mexico, and Washington, the community
system of property prevails, and under that system derived from
the Civil Law, a married woman has absolute power of contract
in respect to her separate estate, but she has no power over the
community property during the lifetime of her husband. Other
states have various restrictions on the right of a married woman
to contract. So in this respect we see that North Dakota stands
as one of the most liberal states.
In North Dakota, the common law rights of curtesy and
dower have been abolished by statute.' The dower rights of the
common law was, of course, a one-third interest in all the husband's real estate which the wife could claim upon his death if
she had not consented to its transfer by joining in the conveyance; and she might assert her claim regardless of how many
times the land had been conveyed.
In this state if the decedent leaves no children and the estate does not exceed $15,000 it goes to the surviving widow. Any
excess over $15,000 is divided between the surviving spouse and
the father and mother of the decedent, or the survivor of them.
Where the husband dies intestate, if there is a surviving widow
and one child the estate is divided equally between them; if a
widow and' more than one child, the surviving spouse takes onethird, and the remainder is divided between or among the children. If the husband is survived only by his widow, and both
his father and mother are dead and the estate does not exceed
$25,000, the whole goes to the widow. Any excess over $25,000
is divided, one-half to the surviving spouse and the other half in
equal share to the brothers and sisters of the decedent, or to their
children. If the decedent leaves none of these above-mentioned
relatives, but the widow, then she receives the whole estate.'
Comparing our law with that of New York, we find that in that
state, when the husband dies and is survived by his parents and
'N. D. Comp. Laws Ann. (1913)1 4414 and 1 6744, subd. 5.
'Breckinridge, A Survey of the Legal Status of Women in the Forty-eight
States (1930) p. 9.
3N. D. CoMp. Laws Ann. (1913) 1 4414, subd. 5; 1 5744.

'N.

). Comp. Laws Ann. (Supp. 1925) 1 5743, subd. 2.
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his widow, the widow receives only $5000 and one-half the residue. And where he leaves a brother or sister, nephew or niece,
the widow receives but $10,000 and half the residue instead of
$25,000, as in North Dakota.'
One peculiar feature of the law of North Dakota is that
there is no provision anywhere in it that the widow may dissent
from her deceased husband's will and elect to take the share
which she would receive in case her husband had died intestate.
A survey of the forty-eight states reveals that South Dakota is
the only other state which lacks such a provision. The laws of
our neighboring state of Minnesota' provide that she may refuse
to accept the provisions of the will and elect to take the share
under the statute of descent. This share under Minnesota law
is an undivided one-third interest in all the lands of, which the
husband at any time during the marriage was possessed, to the
disposition whereof the wife had not consented in writing, except
such as sold by judicial sale, etc. This interest is not the same
as dower, however, as it is a mere expectancy and not to be construed according to the rules of the common law.' In the state
of Montana the wife still has the common law dower interest and
she may elect whether she will take the devise under the will or
renounce it and take her dower in the lands and her share in the
personal estate.
It is a historical fact that one of the reasons why New York
would not accept the Field Code which North Dakota adopted,
was because of this absence of any provision for dower or a substitute therefor. This is, I believe, a defect in the law of this
state that should be the subject of severe criticism. In North Dakota, a man of sound mind can, if he wishes, will a hundred thousand dollars worth of property to his friends, or club, or some institution, and not will five dollars to his wife and family, and
nothing can be done about it, as long as that was his clear intention. In such case there are no grounds for contesting the will,
and the wife has no choice. She cannot, it would seem, refuse to
accept the will and elect to claim her share under the statutes of
descent. The only thing that is guaranteed to her is her right
to the homestead and the $1500 personal property exemption.
The rather liberal homestead provisions may atone somewhat for
this seeming lack of protection mentioned above, although it
would not in a case where the husband's property was nearly all
personalty. The homestead right cannot, of course, be cut off
without the consent of the wife.!
The statutes in regard to homestead rights provide' that the
homestead of every head of a family residing in this state and
consisting of not to exceed two acres of land and the improvements thereon, if within a town plat, and not exceeding in value
'N. Y. Laws (1929) c. 229.
'Mason's Minn. Stat. (1927) 1 8722.
'Scott v. Wells, 55 Minn. 274, 56 . W. 829 (1893); Dayton's Estate v. Johnson, 75 Minn. 4, 77 N. W. 421 (1898).
'N. D. Comp. Laws Ann. (Supp. 1925) 1 5608.
'IN D. Comp. Laws Ann. (Supp. 1925) 1 1 5605, 5607.
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eight thousand dollars, over and above liens or incumbrances,
and if not within a town plat, not exceeding in the aggregate more
than one hundred sixty acres, and consisting of a dwelling house
in which the homestead claimant resides and all of its appurtenances and the land on which same is situated, also all other improvements on said land and regardless of the value of same,
shall be exempt from judgment, lien and from execution or
forced sale except for debts secured by mortgages on the premises
executed and acknowledged by both husband and wife; on debts
secured by labor liens for work done or material furnished exclusivery for the improvement of the same; on debts created for the
purchase thereof and for all taxes accruing and levied thereon;
and on all other debts when upon an appraisal it appears that the
value of such homestead is more than $5000 over and above liens
and incumbrances claimed under Section 5605, and then only to
the extent of any value in excess of the sum total of such liens
and incumbrances plus $5000." In view of the fact that this is
an agricultural state, this homestead provision is very liberal, as
a farmer can claim as a homestead a farm of 160 acres, with
buildings and improvements without any limitation on their value,
where he does not have the aforementioned incumbrance.
The Probate Code provides for an exemption of $1500 of
personal property which shall not be liable for any prior debt of
the decedent except the necessary charges of his last sickness and
funeral and expenses of the administration when there are no
other assets available for payment of such charges." This personal property becomes the absolute property of the surviving
widow and children." The case of Bender v. Bender, decided in
August, 1934, refers to this statute. In this case" it was held
that an ante-nuptial agreement to accept a sum in lieu of the
widow's property rights or claims did not prevent the widow from
claiming exemptions from the husband's estate to the extent of
$1500 under Section 8725, since the widow's right to exemptions
is not in the nature of an interest in property but is a preferred
claim against the estate. The wife's interest in the homestead
is a life interest or an estate for years according to statute." If
the wife is the sole heir of the husband then the death of the husband vests the fee in the homestead in the wife."
The husband is, according to the laws of this state," the
head of the family, and is entitled to certain property exemptions.
A married woman is not entitled to such exemptions, unless she
can prove that her husband is incompetent to earn a living, and
that she is forced to support the family by her own earnings or
from her separated property. If she is sued individually her property is subject to execution with no exemptions, even though
"'N. iD. Comp. Laws Ann. (Supp. 1925) 1 5605; 1 5607, subd. 1, 2 and 3.
IN. D. Comp. Laws Ann. (Supp. 1925) 1 8725.

"Fore v. Fore, 2 N. D. 260, 50 N. W. 712 (1891).
"Bender v. Bender, - N. D. -, 256 N. W. 222 (1934).
"O'Hare v. Bismarck, 45 N. D. 041, 178 N. W. 1017 (1920).
"iCullen v. Sullivan, 51 N. D. 384, 199 N. W. 760 (1924).

6N. D. Comp. Laws Ann. (1913) 1 4408.
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she has been supporting the family by her own efforts, if it appears to the court that the husband is still technically the head of
the family, able and willing to support the family, but nevertheless bankrupt and unsuccessful. Such would seem to be the inference from the case of Ness v. Jones." The court in this case,
however, does make the statement that there may be exceptional
circumstances which will of necessity make the wife the head of
the family, but did not consider the failure and bankruptcy of the
husband in this case sufficient to shift to the wife the headship
of the family. A bankruptcy case which came up from Mississippi cites Ness v. Jones and upholds this view."
It may be well to summarize briefly a few other property
rights of women in this state. The husband has no authority
over the wife's separate estate. Neither husband or wife has any
interest in the property of the other, except that neither can be
excluded from the other's dwelling." The separate property of
the wife is not liable for the debts of her husband." Husband
and wife are jointly and severally liable for any debts contracted by either while living together for necessary household supplies of food, clothing, fuel, and shelter for themselves and family
and for the education of their minor children." According to the
same section the wife owns her own wages earned outside of the
home. The wife after the husband's death is given the personal
property of the husband which would be exempt from execution
if he were living. Also provisions for one year's supply are absolutely exempt from all levy or sale.'
The wife inherits equally
with her husband from a deceased child.'
And the wife is also
entitled to share equally in the services and earnings of a minor
child. '
In closing, I would like to suggest that the one serious defect
in our law as to married women's property rights pointed out
previously, be remedied by the enactment of one statute. This
could very easily be done. No law would have to be amended. It
would require only a statute which would give to a married
woman in this state the right to elect whether she would accept
her husband's will or dissent from it and take the share to which
she is entitled under the statutes of descent and distribution.
Perhaps a law similar to the Minnesota statute' which provides
that the surviving spouse may file a written renunciation of the
will within six months after the probate thereof, would fit in best
with our laws in regard to the property rights of married women,
and would be, I think, a very necessary" and enlightened piece of
legislation.
MARY T. HENNESSY, University of North Dakota.
"Ness v. Jones, 10 N. 'D. 587, 88 N. W. 706 (1901).
"In re Logan, 1 Fed. Supp. 225 (1932).
N. D. Comrp. Laws Ann. (1913) 1 4410.
'W. D. Comp. Laws Ann. (1913) § 4411.
'N. -D. Comp. Laws Ann. (Supp. 1925) § 4414.
-IN. !D. Comp. Laws Ann. (1913) § 8725; N. D. Laws (1929) c.
-N D. Laws (1915), c. 249, p. 370.
"N. D. Laws (1923), c. 153, p. 145.

'Mason's Minn. Stat. (1927) 1 8722.

127, p. 153.

